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Abstract
This paper studies the complexity of solving two classes of non-cooperative games in a distributed manner in which the
players communicate with a set of system nodes over noisy communication channels. The complexity of solving each game
class is defined as the minimum number of iterations required to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) of any game in that class with ǫ
accuracy. First, we consider the class G of all N -player non-cooperative games with a continuous action space that admit at least
one NE. Using information-theoretic inequalities, we derive a lower bound on the complexity of solving G that depends on the
Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set and the total capacity of the communication channels. We also derive a lower bound
on the complexity of solving games in G which depends on the volume and surface area of the constraint set. We next consider
the class of all N -player non-cooperative games with at least one NE such that the players’ utility functions satisfy a certain
(differential) constraint. We derive lower bounds on the complexity of solving this game class under both Gaussian and non-
Gaussian noise models. Our result in the non-Gaussian case is derived by establishing a connection between the Kullback-Leibler
distance and Fisher information.
Index Terms
Non-cooperative games, Nash seeking algorithms, information-based complexity, minimax analysis, Fano’s inequality
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Game theory offers a suite of analytical frameworks for investigating the interaction between rational decision-makers,
hereafter called players. In the past decade, game theory has found diverse applications across engineering disciplines ranging
from power control in wireless networks to modeling the behavior of travelers in a transport system. The Nash Equilibrium
(NE) is the fundamental solution concept for non-cooperative games, in which a number of players compete to maximize
conflicting utility functions that are influenced by the action of others. At the NE, no player benefits from a unilateral deviation
from its NE strategy.
Finding the NE of a non-cooperative game is a fundamental research problem that lies at the heart of game theory literature.
For non-cooperative games with continuous action spaces, various Nash seeking algorithms have been proposed in the literature,
e.g. see [1], [2]. In this paper, we investigate the intrinsic difficulty of finding a NE in such games. Using the notion of complexity
from the convex optimization literature, and information-theoretic inequalities, we derive lower bounds on the minimum number
of iterations required to find a NE within a desired accuracy, for any N -player, non-cooperative game in a given class.
B. Related Work
The book by [3] pioneered the investigation of complexity in convex optimization problems. In this model, an algorithm
sequentially queries an oracle about the objective function of a convex optimization problem, and the oracle responds according
to the queries and the objective function. They derive bounds on the minimum number of queries required to find the global
optimizer of any function in a given function class. In [4], information-theoretic lower bounds were derived on the complexity
of convex optimization problems with a stochastic first order oracle for the class of functions with a known Lipschitz constant.
In a stochastic first order oracle model, the algorithm receives randomized information about the objective function and its
subgradient. These results were extended to different function classes in [5].
The paper [6] considered a model in which the algorithm observes noisy versions of the oracle’s response and established
lower bounds on the complexity of convex optimization problems under first order as well as gradient-only oracles. In [7],
complexity lower bounds were obtained for convex optimization problems with a stochastic zero-order oracle. The paper
[8] studied the complexity of convex optimization problems under a zero-order stochastic oracle in which the optimization
algorithm submits two queries at each iteration and the oracle responds to both queries. These results were extended to the
case in which the algorithm makes queries about multiple points at each iteration in [9]. In [10], the complexity of convex
optimization problems was studied under an erroneous oracle model wherein the oracle’s responses to queries are subject to
absolute/relative errors.
This work was supported by the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects funding scheme (DP140100819). Department of Electrical and
Electronic Engineering, The University of Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia. E-mails: {ehsan.nekouei,gnair,tansu.alpcan,robinje}@unimelb.edu.au. This paper
was presented in part at NecSys 2016 workshop, Tokyo, September 2016.
2Fig. 1. A pictorial representation of the communication graph between system nodes and players. Solid arrows denote the uplink channels
and dashed arrows denote the downlink channels.
C. Contributions
This paper studies the complexity of solving two classes of non-cooperative games in a distributed setting in which players
communicate, not with an oracle, but with a set of utility system nodes (USNs) and constraint system nodes (CSNs) to obtain
the required information for updating their actions. Each USN computes the utility-related information for a subset of players
whereas a CSN evaluates a subset of constraint functions. The communication between players and system nodes is subject
to noise, i.e., the system nodes will receive noisy versions of players’ actions, and the players will receive noisy information
from the system nodes.
First, we consider the game class G which consists of all N -player non-cooperative games with a joint action space defined
by L convex constraints such that all the games in G admit at least one Nash equilibrium (NE). We derive lower bounds on
the minimum number of iterations required to get within ǫ of a NE of any game in G with confidence 1− δ without imposing
any particular structure on the computation model at USNs. Our results indicate that the complexity of solving the game class
G is limited by the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set and the total capacity of communication channels from the
USNs to the players. We also derive a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G in terms of the volume
and surface area of the constraint set. We note that, in a precursor conference paper [11], we have studied the complexity of
solving the game class G under a slightly different setting than that in the current manuscript.
We next consider the game class Gγ which consists of all non-cooperative games with a joint action space defined by L
constraints such that (i) all the games in Gγ admit at least one NE, (ii) the norm of the Jacobian matrix of the pseudo-gradient
vector, induced by utility functions of players, is more than γ. We study the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under
the partial-derivative computation model at USNs and various noise models. Under the partial-derivative computation model,
each player receives a noisy version of the partial derivative of its utility function, with respect to its action, in each iteration.
Our results show that the complexity of solving the game class Gγ up to ǫ accuracy is at least of order 1γ2ǫ2 , as ǫ tends to
zero, with Gaussian communication channels. We also consider a setting in which the channels from system nodes to players
are non-Gaussian and the channels from players to system nodes are noiseless. In the non-Gaussian setting, our results show
that the complexity of solving the game class Gγ up to ǫ accuracy is at least of order 1γ2ǫ2 as ǫ tends to zero. This result is
established by deriving an asymptotic expansion for the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between a non-Gaussian probability
distribution function (PDF) and its shifted version, under some mild assumptions on the non-Gaussian PDF. More precisely, it
is shown that the KL distance between a PDF and its shifted version can be written, up an error term, as a monomial which
is quadratic in the shift parameter and linear in the Fisher information of the corresponding PDF with respect to the shift
parameter.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses our modeling assumptions and problem formulation. Section III
discusses our main results along with their interpretations. All the proofs are relegated to Section IV to improve the readability
of the paper. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Game-theoretic Set-up
Consider a non-cooperative game with N players indexed over N = {1, · · · , N}. Let xi (i ∈ N ), and x = [x1, · · · , xN ]⊤
denote the action of the ith player and the collection of all players’ actions, respectively. The utility function of the ith player
is denoted by ui
(
xi,x−i
)
where x−i is the vector of those other players’ actions that affect the ith player’s utility. The utility
function of the ith player quantifies the desirability of any point in the action space for the ith player. The actions of players
are limited by L convex constraints denoted by g (x) ≤ 0 where g (·) = [g1 (·) , · · · , gL (·)]⊤ is a mapping from RN to RL.
The set of constraint functions is indexed over L = {p ∈ N : 1 ≤ p ≤ L}. Let S denote the action space of players, i.e.,
S = {x ∈ RNs.t. g (x) ≤ 0} .
We assume that S is a compact and convex subset of RN .
3T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) = inf
{
T ∈ N : ∃A s.t. sup
U(·)∈F
inf
i
Pr
(∥∥∥xNEi,U(·) −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ
}
. (1)
In non-cooperative games, each player is interested in maximizing its own utility function, irrespective of other players.
Since the maximizers of utility functions of players do not necessarily coincide with each other, a trade-off is required. In this
paper, the Nash equilibrium is considered as the canonical solution concept of the non-cooperative game among players. Let
xNE ∈ S be the NE of the game among players. Then, at the NE, no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate its action
from its NE strategy, i.e.,
xiNE = arg max
xi∈S(x−iNE,C)
ui
(
xi,x−iNE
)
, ∀i ∈ N ,
where x−iNE,C is the collection of NE strategies of players which are coupled with the ith player through constraints, and
S
(
x
−i
NE,C
)
is the set of possible actions of the ith player given x−iNE,C. The vector of all utility functions is denoted by
U (x) = [u1 (x) , · · · , uN (x)]⊤.
Let F denote the class of functions from RN to RN such that any N -player non-cooperative game with the constraint set
S and utility function vector in F admits at least one NE. By the class of non-cooperative games G = 〈N ,S,F〉, we mean
the set of all games with N players, the action space S, and the utility function vector in F , i.e., U (·) ∈ F .
B. Communication Model
In this paper, we consider a distributed Nash seeking set-up wherein, at each time-step, players communicate with a set of
utility system nodes (USNs) and constraint system nodes (CSNs) to obtain the required utility/constraint related information for
updating their actions. A USN computes utility-related information for a set of players, e.g., the utility functions of players or
their partial derivatives. A CSN evaluates a subset of constraints based on the received actions of players. Each utility function
or constraint is evaluated at only one USN or CSN, respectively. The number of USNs and CSNs are denoted by Ku and Kc,
respectively, with Ku ≤ N and Kc ≤ L. We use USNl (l ∈ {1, . . . ,Ku}) and CSNn (n ∈ {1, . . . ,Kc}) to refer to the lth
USN and nth CSN, respectively.
At each time-step, player i transmits its action to USNl if its action affects at least a utility function evaluated by USNl.
The set of players which transmit their actions to USNl is denoted by Nusnl . We use the mapping π (·), from {1, · · · , N} to
{1, . . . ,Ku}, to indicate the USN which computes the utility-related information for a given player, i.e., π (i) = l if USNl
computes the utility-related information for the ith player. Thus, the utility-related information for the ith player is computed
by USNπ(i).
Similarly, at each time-step, player i transmits its action to CSNn if its action affects at least one constraint function evaluated
by CSNn. The set of players which transmit their actions to CSNn is represented by Ncsnn . We use the mapping φ (·), from
{1, · · · , L} to {1, . . . ,Kc}, to indicate the CSN which evaluates a given constraint function, i.e., φ (p) = n if CSNn evaluates
the pth constraint function. Hence, the pth constraint function is evaluated by CSNφ(p). The set of constraint functions which
are affected by the ith player’s action are denoted by Li.
The communication topology between players and system nodes is given by a bipartite digraph in which the players and
the system nodes form two disjoint sets of vertices. There exists a directed edge, in the communication graph, from the ith
player to USNl if i ∈ Nusnl . Also, there exists a directed edge from USNπ(i) to the ith player for all i ∈ N . Furthermore,
there exist a directed edge from the ith player to CSNn, and a directed edge from CSNn to the ith player if i ∈ Ncsnn . We
refer to communication channels from players to system nodes as uplink channels and the communications channels between
system nodes and players as downlink channels. Fig. 1 shows a pictorial representation of the communication topology between
system nodes and players.
Players communicate with system nodes using frequency division multiplexing (FDM) or time division multiplexing (TDM)
schemes, i.e., each player broadcasts its action to its neighboring system nodes in the communication graph using a dedicated
time or frequency band. Similarly, system nodes communicate with players via FDM or TDM communication schemes. The
communication between players and system nodes is performed over noisy communication channels, i.e., players receive noisy
information from system nodes, and system nodes receive noisy versions of players’ actions. This will be made more explicit
in the next subsection.
C. Nash Seeking Algorithms
1) The Update Rule: In this paper, we consider a general structure for the Nash seeking algorithms which allows each player’s
action to be updated using the past actions of that player as well as the past received utility/constraint related information by
4that player. Let A be such a Nash seeking algorithm. Then, under A, the ith player’s action at time k, i.e., xik , is updated
according to the update rule
xik = Aik
(
X i1:k−1, Yˆ
i
1:k−1, Zˆ
i
1:k−1
)
,
where X i1:k−1 is the history of the ith player’s actions from time 1 to k − 1, Yˆ i1:k−1 denotes the sequence of received utility-
related information by the ith player from time 1 to k − 1, and Zˆi1:k−1 denotes the sequence of received constraint-related
information by the ith player from time 1 to k− 1. Here, Aik (·, ·, ·) is a mapping from Rk−1 ×Rk−1 ×R(k−1)|Li| to R. Note
that X i1:k−1, Yˆ i1:k−1 and Zˆi1:k−1 can be written as
X i1:k−1 =
{
xit
}k−1
t=1
,
Yˆ i1:k−1 =
{
yˆit
}k−1
t=1
,
Zˆi1:k−1 =
{
zˆ
i,p
t , p ∈ Li
}k−1
t=1
,
, respectively, where xit is the action of the ith player at time t, yˆit denotes the received utility-related information by the ith
player at time t and zˆi,pt denotes the received information regarding the pth constraint by the ith player at time t.
The kth step of the algorithm A is denoted by
Ak
(
X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1
)
=
{
Aik
(
X i1:k−1, Yˆ
i
1:k−1, Zˆ
i
1:k−1
)}
i
,
where
X1:k−1 =
{
xit : i ∈ N
}k−1
t=1
,
Yˆ1:k−1 =
{
yˆit : i ∈ N
}k−1
t=1
,
Zˆ1:k−1 =
{
zˆ
i,p
t : i ∈ N , p ∈ Li
}k−1
t=1
.
We refer to
A =
{
Ak
(
X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1
)}
k
,
as the Nash seeking algorithm A.
2) Communication and Computation At USNs: The received action of the ith player by USNl at time k, i.e., xˆik,usnl , can
be written as
xˆik,usnl = x
i
k +W
i
k,usnl ,
where W ik,usnl is the noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to USNl. Let Xˆ
usnl
1:k =
{
xˆit,usnl : i ∈ Nusnl
}k
t=1
denote the
history of actions received by USNl from time 1 to time k. At time k, USNl computes yik, i.e., the utility-related information
for player i at time k, for all i such that π (i) = l.
In this paper, we study the complexity of solving non-cooperative games under two computation models at USNs. We first
consider a general computation model in which yik is allowed to be any arbitrary function of ui (·) and the information available
at USNl from time 1 to k, i.e.,
yik = Ok,i
(
Xˆusnl1:k , ui (·)
)
∀i : π (i) = l. (2)
where Ok,i (·, ·) is a functional. This formulation allows us to capture the complexity of solving the game class G under a
general class of computation models at USNs in Theorem 1. We refer to O =
{
Ok,i
(
Xˆ
usnπ(i)
1:k , ui (·)
)}
k,i
as the general
computation model at USNs.
We also study the complexity of solving non-cooperative games under the partial-derivative computation model in which
USNl at time k evaluates the partial derivative of the utility function of the ith player with respect to its action, i.e., yik =
∂
∂(xi)ui
(
xi,x−i
)∣∣∣
Xˆ
usnl
k
for all i with π (i) = l. We refer to the partial-derivative computational model for USNs as
O1 =
{
O1k,i
(
Xˆ
usnπ(i)
k , ui (·)
)}
k,i
(3)
where Xˆusnlk =
{
xˆik,usnl : i ∈ Nusnl
}
denotes the set of actions received by USNl at time k and
O1k,i
(
Xˆ
usnπ(i)
k , ui (·)
)
=
∂
∂ (xi)
ui
(
xi,x−i
)∣∣∣∣
x=Xˆ
usnπ(i)
k
.
5Then, USNl transmits yik to the ith player for all i with π (i) = l. The received utility-related information by the ith player
at time k can be written as
yˆik = y
i
k + V
i
k ,
where V ik is the noise in the downlink channel from the USNπ(i) to the ith player.
3) Communication and Computation At CSNs: The received action of the ith player by CSNn at time k, i.e, xˆik,csnn , can
be written as
xˆik,csnn = x
i
k +W
i
k,csnn ,
where W ik,csnn is the noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to CSNn. The collection of received actions at time k by
the CSNn is denoted by Xˆcsnnk =
{
xˆik,csnn : i ∈ Ncsnn
}
. At time k, CSNn evaluates its associated constraint functions using
the received actions at time k, i.e.,
z
p
k = gp
(
Xˆcsnnk
)
, ∀p : φ (p) = n
Finally, CSNn broadcasts zpk to the players which their actions affect gp (·). If the action of the ith player affects the pth
constraint, the ith player will receive
zˆ
i,p
k = z
p
k + V
i,p
k ,
at time k where V i,pk is the noise in the downlink channel from CSNφ(p) to the player i.
Remark 1: Although, we assume that the CSNn at time k transmits gp
(
Xˆcsnnk
)
to the ith player (if p ∈ Li), our results
continue to hold when other computation models are implemented at the CSNs, e.g., when the CSNn at time k transmits
∂
∂xi
gp (x)
∣∣
x=Xˆcsnn
k
to the ith player.
TABLE I
TABLE OF THE MAIN VARIABLES
Variable Description
N The set of players
L The set of constraints
Li The set of constraints which are affected by the ith player action
USNπ(i) The USN which computes utility-related information for the ith player
CSNφ(p) The CSN which evaluates the pth constraint
Nusnl The set of players which transmit their actions to USNl
Ncsnn The set of players which transmit their actions to CSNn
xik Action of the ith player at time k
X i1:k Actions of the ith player from time 1 to k
X1:k Actions of all the players from time 1 to k
xˆik,usnl The received action of the ith player by USNl at time k
Xˆusnlk The collection of received actions by USNl at time k
Xˆusnl1:k The collection of received actions by USNl from time 1 to k
yik The utility-related information computed by USNπ(i) for the ith player
yˆik The received utility-related information by the ith player
Yˆ i1:k The history of received utility-related information by the ith players from time 1 to k
Yˆ1:k The history of received utility-related information by all the players from time 1 to k
xˆik,csnn The received action of the ith player by CSNn at time k
Xˆcsnnk The collection of received actions by CSNn at time k
z
p
k The value of the pth constraint at time k evaluated by CSNφ(p)
zˆ
i,p
k The received value of the pth constraint at time k by the ith player
Zˆi1:k The history of received constraint-related information by the ith players from time 1 to k
Zˆ1:k The history of received constraint-related information by all the players from time 1 to k
W ik,usnl The additive noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to USNl at time k (i ∈ Nusnl )
W ik,csnn The additive noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to CSNn at time k (i ∈ Ncsnn )
V ik The additive noise in the downlink channel from USNπ(i) to the ith player at time k
V
i,p
k The additive noise in the downlink channel which transmits z
p
k to the ith player at time k (p ∈ Li)
6D. The Complexity Criterion
Consider the class of games G and and the computation model O. Then, the (ǫ, δ)-complexity of solving the class of games
G with the computation model O, denoted by T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O), is defined in (1) where xNEi,U(·) is a NE of the non-cooperative
game with the utility function vector given by U (·) ∈ F . According to (1), the (ǫ, δ)-complexity of solving the class of games
G with the computation model O is defined as the smallest positive integer T for which there exists an algorithm A such
that, for any game in G, the probability of ǫ deviation of the algorithm’s output at time T +1 from at least a NE of the game
is less than δ. Note that (1) assigns a positive integer to any class of games. For a given pair of (G,O), a small value of
T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) indicates that the class of games G with the computation model O can be solved faster compared to a large value
of T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O). The complexity of solving the game class G under the computation model O1 can be defined in a similar way.
Remark 2: The ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE) is a closely related solution concept to the NE which is defined as the point
such that no play can gain more than ǫ by unilaterally deviating its strategy from its ǫ-NE strategy. However, an ǫ-NE is not
always close to a NE since game-theoretic problems are not necessarily convex problems and a NE is not necessarily the
maximizer/minimizer of utility functions of all players [12]. Hence, we do not consider ǫ-NE as a solution concept in this
paper.
E. Modeling Assumptions
In this paper, we impose the following assumptions on the Nash seeking algorithms and the noise terms in the uplink/downlink
communication channels:
1) X1 is specified by the algorithm A, and the algorithm A uses the same value of X1 for solving any game.
2)
{
W ik,usnl , i ∈ Nusnl
}
k
is a collection of zero mean, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with
variance σ2usnl > 0 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ Ku.
3)
{
W ik,csnn , i ∈ Ncsnn
}
k
is a collection of zero mean, i.i.d. random variables with variance σ2csnn > 0 for all 1 ≤ n ≤ Kc.
4)
{
V ik , V
i,p
k , p ∈ Li
}
k
is a collection of i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and variance σ2i > 0 for all i ∈ N .
5) All the uplink/downlink noise terms are jointly independent.
F. Organization of The Paper and Notations
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section III states our main results on the complexity of solving two classes
of non-cooperative games. Section IV presents the derivation of our results, and Section V concludes the paper.
In the rest of this paper, we use the following notations from asymptotic analysis literature. For two positive functions
f (x) and g (x), we say f (x) = Ω (g (x)) if lim infx↓0 f(x)g(x) > 0. We also say f (x) = Θ (g (x)) if lim infx↓0
f(x)
g(x) > 0 and
lim supx↓0
f(x)
g(x) <∞. Our main notations are summarized in Table I.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we establish various lower bounds on the complexity of solving two game classes under different assumptions
on the distribution of uplink/downlink noise terms and different computation models at USNs. In Subsection III-A, we derive
two lower bounds on the complexity of solving the game class G under the general computation model at USNs without
assuming any particular distribution for the uplink/downlink noise terms. In Subsection III-B, we establish a lower bound on
the complexity of solving a subclass of G, denoted by Gγ , under Gaussian uplink/downlink channels and the partial-derivative
computation model. Subsection III-B presents a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under noiseless
uplink channels, non-Gaussian downlink channels, and the partial-derivative computation model. Subsection III-D discusses
the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under the partial-derivative computation model when both uplink and downlink
channels are non-Gaussian distributed.
A. General Computation model at USNs and General Uplink/Downlink Channels
In this subsection, we study the computational complexity of solving the game class G without imposing any particular
structure on the computation model at the USNs, or imposing any specific probability distribution on the noise in the
uplink/downlink channels. To this end, we first give the definition of the total capacity of downlink channels, the notion
of 2ǫ-distinguishable subsets of S, and the Kolmogorov capacity of S.
The total capacity of downlink channels from USNs to players is defined as
Cdown = max
pY (y),E[‖Y ‖2]≤α
I
[
y1, · · · , yN ; yˆ1, · · · , yˆN]
where yi and yˆi are the input and the output of the downlink channel from USNπ(i) to the ith player, respectively, Y =[
y1, · · · , yN]⊤, pY (y) is the joint distribution of Y , and α is the total average power constraint of the downlink channels
between USNs and players.
7Definition 1: A subset of S is 2ǫ-distinguishable if the distance between any two of its points is more than 2ǫ [13].
Definition 2: Let M2ǫ (S) denote the cardinality of maximal size 2ǫ distinguishable subsets of S. Then, the Kolmogorov
capacity of S is defined as logM2ǫ (S) [13].
The next theorem establishes a lower bound on T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O).
Theorem 1: Let T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) denote the complexity of the class of N -player non-cooperative games G with the continuous
action space S. Then, we have
T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) ≥
(1− δ) logM2ǫ (S)− 1
Cdown
(4)
where Cdown is the total capacity downlink channels from USNs to players, and logM2ǫ (S) is the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity
of the action space S.
Proof: See Subsection IV-A.
Theorem 1 establishes an algorithm-independent lower bound on the order of complexity of solving the game class G. According
to this theorem, T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) is lower bounded by the ratio of the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the action space S to the total
Shannon capacity of the downlink channels. Note that the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of S can be interpreted as a measure of
players’ ambiguity about their NE strategies. Thus, as logM2ǫ (S) becomes large, T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) is expected to increase since
players have to search in a bigger space to find their NE strategies. Based on Theorem 1, Cdown has a reverse impact on
T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O). Note that Cdown is an indication of the information transmission quality from USNs to players. That is, as Cdown
decreases, players will receive noisier information regarding their utility functions compared with a large value of Cdown.
Theorem 1 depends on the 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set S which is usually hard to compute unless the action space of
players is restricted to special geometries. As M2ǫ (S) is just the maximum number of ǫ-balls that can be packed into S, it is
asymptotically equal to Vol(S)Vol(Bǫ) =
Vol(S)
αN ǫN
as ǫ tends to zero, where Bǫ is the N -ball of radius ǫ, and αN is the N -dimensional
spherical constant under the assumed norm. Thus, the complexity is at least of order log 1
ǫ
as ǫ becomes small. The next result
establishes a non-asymptotic lower bound of the same order, by lower bounding M2ǫ (S) using a result from lattice theory.
Corollary 1: The complexity of solving the class of N -player non-cooperative games G with continuous action space S can
be bower bounded as
T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) ≥
(1− δ)(N log 12ǫ+log (Vol (S)−ǫP (S)))− 1
Cdown
(5)
where Vol (S) and P (S) are the volume and the surface area of the action space of players, respectively.
Proof: See Subsection IV-B.
Based on Corollary 1, the lower bound on T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) increases at least linearly with the number of players. This is due to the
fact that the amount of uncertainty about the NE increases as the number of players becomes large. Recall that logM2ǫ (S) is
a quantitative indicator of ambiguity about the NE. Furthermore, ǫ has a logarithmic effect on T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O), i.e., the complexity
of solving the class of games G increases according to Ω (log 1
ǫ
)
as ǫ becomes small. Hence, based on Corollary 1, the game
class G cannot be solved faster than Θ (log 1
ǫ
)
time-steps regardless of uplink/downlink noise distributions, and the computation
model at the USNs.
According to Corollary 1, the lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G increases as the volume of the
action space of players becomes large. Also, for a given surface area of action space of players, i.e., P (S), the volume of
action space of players can be upper bounded using the isoperimetric inequality for convex bodies [14] as follows:
Vol (S) ≤ Vol (B)
(P (B))
N
N−1
P (S) NN−1 (6)
where B is the closed unit ball in N -dimensional Euclidean space RN . Note that the equality in (6) is achieved if and only
if S is a ball in RN [14]. Thus, for a given surface area of action space of players P (S), the lower bound on the complexity
of solving games in the class G increases as the action space of players becomes closer to a ball in RN with the volume
Vol(B)
(P(B))
N
N−1
P (S) NN−1 .
B. Partial-derivative Computation Model at USNs and Gaussian Uplink/Downlink Channels
In this section, we establish a lower bound on the complexity of solving a subclass of G, denoted by Gγ , under the partial-
derivative computation model (see equation (3)) when the communication noise in the uplink and downlink channels is Gaussian
distributed. We also compare the complexity of solving the game class Gγ with the complexity of solving the class of strongly
convex optimization problems. To specify the game class Gγ , we first define the notion of pseudo-gradient for a utility function
vector as follows.
Definition 3: The pseudo-gradient of the utility function vector U (x) = [u1 (x1,x−1) , · · · , uN (xN ,x−N)]⊤ is defined
8as
∇˜U (x)=
[
∂
∂ (x1)
u1
(
x1,x−1
)
, · · · , ∂
∂ (xN )
uN
(
xN ,x−N
)]⊤
We use J∇˜U (x) to denote the Jacobian matrix of the vector valued function ∇˜U (x), i.e.,
[J∇˜U (x)]ij =
∂2
∂ (xj) (xi)
ui
(
xi,x−i
)
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
We next specify a set of utility vector functions, denoted by Fγ , which is used to define the game class Gγ .
Definition 4: The set of utility vector functions Fγ is defined as the set of all vector valued functions U (x) from RN to
R
N such that
1) The N -player non-cooperative game with utility vector function given by U (x) and the constraint set S admits at least
a Nash equilibrium (NE).
2) The matrix J∇˜U (x) exists for all x in S.
3) The matrix J∇˜U (x) satisfies
∥∥∥J∇˜U(x)∥∥∥ ≥ γ > 0 for all x ∈ S where ‖J∇˜U (x)‖ denotes the matrix norm of J∇˜U (x).
The next definition specifies the game class Gγ .
Definition 5: The class of games Gγ = 〈N ,S,Fγ〉 is defined as the set of all non-cooperative games with N players, the
constraint set S, and the utility function vector U (·) in Fγ .
Note that the game class Gγ reduces to the class G when γ is equal to zero. The complexity of solving the game class Gγ
heavily depends on J∇˜U (x) as shown in Theorem 2.
Remark 3: We note that both ∇˜U (x) and J∇˜U (x) play important roles in the game theory and system theory literature. To
clarify this point, consider an unconstrained N -player game with the utility vector function U (x) =
[
ui
(
xi,x−i
)]
i
such that
each ui
(
xi,x−i
)
is concave in xi. Then, any solution of ∇˜U (x) = 0 will be a NE of this game. Also, consider the dynamical
system x˙ = ∇˜U (x). Then, any NE of the aforementioned game will be an equilibrium of this dynamical system and the
eigenvalues of the matrix J∇˜U (x) determine the local stability of this dynamical system around its equilibria. Moreover, the
matrix J∇˜U (x) can be used to study the uniqueness of the NE in non-cooperative games [15].
The next theorem studies the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under the partial-derivative computation model and
Gaussian distributed uplink/downlink channels. In the derivation of Theorem 2, it is assumed that the constraint set S contains
a 2-ball with radius
√
2ǫ, i.e., the set of all points in a 2-dimensional plane with the distance
√
2ǫ from a point in S.
Theorem 2: Let T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) denote the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under the partial-derivative computation
model at USNs. Then, for Gaussian distributed uplink/downlink channels and δ ≤ 0.5, we have
T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) ≥ (2 (1− δ)− 1)mini σ2i
4γ2ǫ2
, (7)
where σ2i is the variance of noise at the player i’s receiver.
Proof: See Subsection IV-C.
Theorem 2 establishes an algorithm-independent lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ . According
to this result, the game class Gγ cannot be solved faster than Θ
(
1
γ2ǫ2
)
under the partial-derivative computation model and
Gaussian noise model for uplink and downlink channels.
It is helpful to compare the complexity of solving the game class Gγ with that of solving a black-box convex optimization
problem. The complexity of solving black-box optimization problems is studied under an oracle-based setting in which
optimization algorithms rely on an oracle for function evaluation. In this setting, the oracle receives noise-free queries from
the optimization algorithm, and, the algorithm receives a noisy version of oracle’s response [6]. The next corollary studies
the complexity of solving the game class Gγ in a similar setting, i.e., under noiseless uplink channels and Gaussian downlink
channels.
Corollary 2: Let T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) denote the complexity of solving the class Gγ using the partial-derivative computation model.
Then, for noiseless uplink channels, Gaussian distributed downlink channels and δ ≤ 0.5, we have
T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) ≥ (2 (1− δ)− 1)mini σ2i
4γ2ǫ2
.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is skipped.
Next, we use Corollary 2 to compare the complexity of solving the class Gγ with the complexity of solving a class of convex
optimization problems using the oracle-based setting. To this end, consider the following optimization problem
min
x∈S
f (x) ,
9where S is a convex set, and f (x) belongs to the class of continuous and strongly convex functions Fsc. The complexity of
solving the class of convex optimization problems with the objective function in Fsc is defined as [6]
inf
{
T ∈ N : ∃A s.t. sup
f(·)∈Fsc
Pr (f (xT+1)− f⋆ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ
}
where xT+1 is the output of the algorithm A after T queries, and f⋆ = infx∈S f (x). It is shown in [6] that the complexity of
solving the class of strictly convex optimization problems under the subgradient computation model and Gaussian noise model
is given by Ω
(
1
ǫ
)
. According to the Corollary 2, the game class Gγ is harder to solve compared with the class of strictly convex
optimization problems since the games are non-convex problems, and NE is more sophisticated solution concept compared
with the minimizer of a convex function (see Remark 2 for more details).
C. Partial-derivative Computation Model at USNs, Non-Gaussian Downlink Channels and Noiseless Uplink Channels
In this subsection, we study the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under the partial-derivative computation model
when the downlink channels are not necessarily Gaussian and the uplink channels are noiseless. To this end, let pV i (x)
denote the common probability distribution function (PDF) of the collection of random variables {V ik}k, i.e., the collection
of noise terms in the downlink channel from USNπ(i) to player i. To investigate the complexity of the game class Gγ in the
non-Gaussian setting, we assume that pV i (x) satisfies the following mild assumptions for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N
1) The PDF pV i (x) is non-zero everywhere on R.
2) The PDF pV i (x) is at least 3 times continuously differentiable, i.e., pV i (x) ∈ C3.
3) There exist positive constants β1, β2, β3 > 0 such that∣∣∣∣ d3dx3 log pV i (x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ β1 + β2 |x|β3 ∀x ∈ R
4) The tail of the random variable
∣∣V ik ∣∣ decays faster than x−(β3+1), i.e., we have
lim
x→∞x
(β3+1+r)Pr
{∣∣V ik ∣∣ ≥ x} = 0 ∀k
for some r > 0.
The next theorem derives a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ in the non-Gaussian setting.
Theorem 3: Let T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) denote the complexity of solving the N -player non-cooperative games in the class Gγ using
the partial-derivative computation model at USNs. Assume that the PDFs of the downlink noise terms satisfy the assumptions
1-4 above and the uplink channels are noiseless. Then, for δ ≤ 0.5 we have
T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) ≥ 2 (1− δ)− 1
4Nǫ2γ2maxi Ii +O (ǫ3) .
where Ii is the Fisher information of the PDF pV i (x) with respect to a shift parameter.
Proof: See Subsection IV-D.
Theorem 3 establishes a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under noiseless uplink channels and
non-Gaussian downlink channels. In Corollary 2, we showed that the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under the
partial-derivative computation model is at least of the order 1
γ2ǫ2
, as ǫ becomes small, when the uplink channels are noiseless
and the downlink channels are Gaussian distributed. According to Theorem 3, the lower bound on the complexity of solving the
game class Gγ is also of the order 1γ2ǫ2 when the uplink channels are noiseless and the downlink channels are not necessarily
Gaussian distributed.
Theorem 3 is established by deriving an asymptotic expansion for the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the PDF
pV i (x) and its shifted version. More precisely, we show that
D [pV i (x) ‖pAiτ+V i (x) ] =
1
2
Ii (Aiτ )2 +O
(
‖τ‖3
)
where Ai is a 1-by-N row vector, τ is an N -by-1 column vector, pAiτ+V i (x) is the PDF of Aiτ + V i, and Ii is the Fisher
information of pV i (x) with respect to a shift parameter. Since the Taylor series of a real function is not necessarily convergent,
Theorem 3 is proved using Taylor expansion Theorem. The assumptions 1-4 above are used to bound the remainder integral
which appears in the Taylor expansion (see Lemma 6 in Subsection IV-D and its proof for more details).
D. Partial-derivative Computation Model at USNs With Arbitrarily Distributed Uplink and Downlink Channels
The next theorem establishes a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ under the partial-derivative
computation model when the uplink and downlink channels are not necessarily Gaussian distributed.
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Theorem 4: The complexity of solving the game class Gγ using the partial-derivative computation model at USNs is lower
bounded by
T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) ≥ sup
A:‖A‖≥γ,S2ǫ∈S
(1− δ) log |S2ǫ| − 1
I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
] (8)
where S2ǫ is a 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S, A = [aij ] is an N -by-N symmetric, negative definite matrix, x⋆M is a random
vector taking value in S2ǫ with uniform distribution, the random vector WˆA =
[
Wˆ i1
]N
i=1
is defined as
Wˆ i1 =

 ∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
aijW
j
1,usnπ(i)

+ V i1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
and I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
is the mutual information between x⋆M and −Ax⋆M + WˆA.
Proof: See Subsection 4.
Theorem 8 derives a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ which depends on the constraint set S,
the constant γ and the noise distribution in the uplink and downlink channels. The optimization in (8) is over the set of all
symmetric, negative definite matrices with norm greater than or equal to γ, and the set of all 2ǫ-distinguishable subsets of
S. The matrix A in (8) stems from the construction of quadratic utility functions in the proof of Theorem 4, the set S2ǫ and
the matrix A jointly represent a finite subset of the function class Fγ , and Wˆ i1 represents the combined impact of uplink and
downlink channels at player i’s receiver under the constructed quadratic utility functions (see the proof of this theorem for
more details).
Theorem 4 can be used to numerically obtain a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class Gγ up to ǫ
accuracy when the uplink/downlink channels are not Gaussian distributed. Note that according to (8), T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) can be
lower bounded as
T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1) ≥ (1− δ) log |S2ǫ| − 1
I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
] (9)
where A is a symmetric, negative definite matrix with ‖A‖ ≥ γ and S2ǫ is a 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S. Thus, by
numerically evaluating the mutual information term in (9), one can obtain a lower bound on T ⋆ǫ,δ
(Gγ ,O1).
The lower bound in Theorem 4 has the following information-theoretic interpretation. Consider an auxiliary multiple-input-
single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with x⋆M as input and the −Ax⋆M + WˆA as output. Here, the channel input, i.e., x⋆M ,
takes value from the finite set of input alphabets S2ǫ with uniform distribution. The symmetric, positive definite matrix −A
acts on the input, and the received signal by player i is given by −Aix⋆M + Wˆ i1 where Ai is the ith row of A. Note that
log |S2ǫ| can be intuitively interpreted as the transmitter’s bit-rate and I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
can be intuitively deemed as the
amount of common information between the transmitted signal and the set of received signals by players. Therefore,
R(A,S2ǫ) =
I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
(1− δ) log |S2ǫ| − 1
can be viewed as the relative common information between the transmitted signal and the set of received signals by players
for a particular choice of the set S2ǫ and the matrix A. Note that I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
≤ H [x⋆M ] = log |S2ǫ| as x⋆M is
uniformly distributed over S2ǫ. Thus, according to (8), the complexity of solving the game class Gγ is limited by the choice
of S2ǫ and A such that the transmitted signal and the set of received signals by players have the smallest amount of relative
common information.
IV. DERIVATIONS OF RESULTS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following four steps:
1) Firstly, we construct a finite subset of F , denoted by F ′(see subsection IV-A1 for more details).
2) Secondly, for the function class F ′, the Nash seeking problem is reduced to a hypothesis test problem (see subsection
IV-A2 for more details).
3) Thirdly, the generalized Fano inequality is used to obtain a lower bound on the error probability of the hypothesis test
problem (see subsection IV-A2 for more details).
4) Finally, information-theoretic inequalities are used to obtain an upper bound on the mutual information term which
appears in the generalized Fano inequality.
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1) Restricting the Class of Utility Function Vectors: The first step in deriving the lower bound on T ⋆ǫ,δ (G,O) is to restrict
our analysis to an appropriately chosen, finite subset of F . To this end, let
S⋆2ǫ = {x⋆m ∈ S : m = 1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)} (10)
be a maximal size, 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S where M2ǫ (S) is the cardinality of maximal size, 2ǫ-distinguishable subsets
of S (see Definition 1 for more details on 2ǫ-distinguishable subsets of S). Next, for each x⋆m ∈ S⋆2ǫ (m = 1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)),
we construct a utility function vector Um (x) such that x⋆m is the NE of the non-cooperative game with N players, utility
function vector Um (x) and the action space S.
The utility function vector Um (x) (m = 1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)) is constructed as follows. Let A = [aij ]i,j be a symmetric, negative
definite N -by-N matrix. Also, let um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
= aii2
(
xi
)2
+xi
(
−Aix⋆m +
∑
j 6=i aijx
j
)
denote the utility function of player
i where Ai is the ith row of A. The utility function vector Um (x) is constructed as Um (x) =
[
um,i
(
xi,x−i
)]⊤
i
. Let F ′ be
the finite set of utility function vectors defined as
F ′ = {Um (·) ∈ F ,m = 1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)} (11)
Clearly, we have |F ′| =M2ǫ (S).
The next lemma shows that the utility function vector Um (x) belongs to the function class F , i.e., the class of vector-valued
functions from RN to RN such that any N -player non-cooperative game with the constraint set S and utility function vector
in F admits at least one NE.
Lemma 1: Consider the N -player non-cooperative game in which: (i) the utility function of the ith player is given by
um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
= aii2
(
xi
)2
+ xi
(
−Aix⋆m +
∑
j 6=i aijx
j
)
, (ii) the action space of players is given by S. Then, x⋆m is a NE
of the game among players, and we have Um (x) ∈ F .
Proof: To prove this result, we first show that x⋆m is the NE of the unconstrained, N -player non-cooperative game with
the utility function vector Um (x) as follows. Consider the non-cooperative game in which the utility function of player i is
given by um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
. Then, the best response of the ith player to x−i is obtained by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
xi
um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
(12)
where um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
= aii2
(
xi
)2
+ xi
(
−Aix⋆m +
∑
j 6=i aijx
j
)
. Note that aii < 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N as the matrix A is negative
definite. Thus, the objective function in (12) is strongly concave in xi and the optimization problem (12) admits a unique
solution. The best response of player i to x−i can be obtained using the first order necessary and sufficient optimality condition:
−Aix⋆m +
N∑
j=1
aijx
j = 0
Note that any intersection of the best responses of players is a NE. Thus, the NE of the unconstrained game can be found by
solving the following system of linear equations
−Aix⋆m+
N∑
j=1
aijx
j = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (13)
It can be easily verified that x⋆m is a solution of (13) which implies x⋆m is a NE of the N -player, unconstrained non-cooperative
game with the utility function vector Um (x). Since x⋆m belongs to S, it is also a NE of the N -player, non-cooperative game
with the utility function vector Um (x) and the action space S. Thus, Um (·) belongs to the function class F .
Lemma 1 implies that F ′ is a subset of F . We refer to the class of N -player non-cooperative games with the utility function
vectors in F ′ and the action space S as G′ = 〈N ,S,F ′〉. Here, we make the technical assumption that each game in the game
class G′ admits a unique NE. This assumption can be satisfied by imposing more structure on the constraint set S, e.g., see
[15]. In this paper, we do not explicitly impose a specific requirement on the action space S to guarantee the uniqueness of
NE for the games in G′ since these restrictions are only sufficient conditions (not necessary and sufficient) to guarantee the
existence of a unique NE.
Now, for a given ǫ and δ, consider any algorithm A for which after T time-steps, we have
sup
U(·)∈F
inf
i
Pr
(∥∥∥xNEi,U(·)−AT+1(X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥≥ǫ) ≤ δ.
Since F ′ is a subset of F and any game in G′ admits a unique NE, we have
sup
m=1,··· ,M2ǫ(S)
Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ. (14)
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2) A Genie-aided Hypothesis Test: In this subsection, we construct a genie-aided hypothesis test as follows which operates
based on the output of the algorithm A. Consider a genie-aided hypothesis test in which, first, a genie selects a game instance
from G′ uniformly at random. Let x⋆M ∈ S⋆2ǫ and UM (·) ∈ F ′ denote the NE and the utility function vector associated
with the randomly selected game instance, respectively, where M is a random variable uniformly distributed over the set
{1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)}.
At time k ∈ {1, · · · , T }, the ith player updates its action using the algorithmA according to xik = Aik
(
X i1:k−1, Yˆ
i
1:k−1, Zˆ
i
1:k−1
)
.
At time T + 1, the genie estimates the NE according to the following decision rule:
xˆ
⋆ = arg min
x∈S⋆2ǫ
∥∥∥x−AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ (15)
where xˆ⋆ ∈ S⋆2ǫ is the closest elements of S⋆2ǫ to the output of algorithm. An error is declared if the error event
EA = {x⋆M 6= xˆ⋆}
happens, that is, if the estimated NE is not equal to the true NE. The next lemma establishes an upper bound on the probability
of the error event EA.
Lemma 2: Let Pr (EA) denote the error probability under the proposed genie-aided hypothesis test. Then,
Pr (EA) ≤ sup
m∈{1,··· ,M2ǫ(S)}
Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ)
where x⋆m is the NE corresponding to the utility function vector Um (·).
Proof: We show that the error event EA implies∥∥∥x⋆M −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ > ǫ
by contraposition. That is, we show if the following inequality holds∥∥∥x⋆M −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ, (16)
then, we have xˆ⋆ = x⋆M . Assume that the inequality (16) holds. For x⋆m 6= x⋆M , we have
2ǫ
(a)
< ‖x⋆m − x⋆M‖
≤
∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ + ∥∥∥x⋆M −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥
<
∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ + ǫ
where (a) follows from the fact that x⋆m and x⋆M belong to the 2ǫ-distinguishable set S⋆2ǫ. Thus, x⋆m cannot be the solution
of the optimization problem (15). Therefore, we have
Pr (EA) ≤ Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆M −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ)
= EM
[
Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆M −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ∣∣∣M)]
≤ sup
m∈{1,··· ,M2ǫ(S)}
Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ)
which completes the proof.
We next use Fano inequality to obtain a lower bound on Pr (EA). To this end, let the random variable M ∈ {1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)}
encode the choice of utility function vector from the set F ′. Also, let the random variable Mˆ ∈ {1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)} encode the
estimated NE by genie. Then, using Fano inequality [16], we have
Pr (EA) ≥
H
[
M
∣∣∣Mˆ ]− 1
logM2ǫ (S)
(a)
=≥ 1−
1 + H [M ]− H
[
M
∣∣∣Mˆ ]
logM2ǫ (S)
= 1−
1 + I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
logM2ǫ (S) (17)
where (a) follow from the fact that H [M ] = logM2ǫ (S) since M is uniformly distributed over {1, · · · ,M2ǫ (S)}. Using
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(14), (17) and Lemma 2, we have
δ ≥ 1−
1 + I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
logM2ǫ (S) (18)
Next, we obtain an upper bound on I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
using information theoretic inequalities.
3) Applying information theoretic inequalities: First note that
(
M,
{
X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T
}
, Mˆ
)
form a Markov chain as
follows: M −→ X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T −→ Mˆ . Therefore, we have
I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
≤ I
[
M ;X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T
]
. (19)
Using the chain rule for mutual information, I
[
M ;X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T
]
can be expanded as
I
[
M ;X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T
]
=
T∑
k=1
I
[
M ;Xk, Yˆk, Zˆk
∣∣∣X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 ] (20)
where Xk =
[
xik
]
i
is the collection of players’ actions at time k, Yˆk =
[
yˆik
]
i
is the collection of all received utility-related
information by players at time k, and Zˆk =
{
zˆ
i,p
k : p ∈ Li
}
i
is the collection of all constraint-related information received by
players at time k where Li is the set of constraints affected by the ith player’s action.
Using the chain rule for conditional mutual information, we have
I
[
M ;Xk, Yˆk, Zˆk
∣∣∣X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 ] = I [M ;Xk ∣∣∣X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 ]+ I [M ; Zˆk ∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 ]
+ I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
Note that Zˆk can be written as Zˆk =
{
gp
(
Xˆ
csnφ(p)
k
)
+ V i,pk : p ∈ Li
}
i
where Xˆcsnφ(p)k =
{
xik +W
i
k,csnφ(p)
}
i∈Ncsnφ(p)
. Thus,
given Xk, Zˆk only depends on
{
W ik,csnφ(p) : i ∈ Ncsnφ(p)
}
p
and
{
V
i,p
k : p ∈ Li
}
i
which are independent of{
M,X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1
}
. Thus, we have M,X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 −→ Xk −→ Zˆk and
I
[
M ; Zˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 ] = 0
Also, we have
I
[
M ;Xk
∣∣∣X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 ] = 0
since xik = Aik
(
X i1:k−1, Yˆ
i
1:k−1, Zˆ
i
1:k−1
)
, and the collection of random variables
(
M,
{
X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1
}
, Xk
)
from
a Markov chain as follows M −→ X1:k−1, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k−1 −→ Xk. Thus, we have
I
[
M ;X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T
]
=
T∑
k=1
I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] (21)
Now, I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] can be upper bounded as
I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] ≤ I [M,Yk; Yˆk ∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
= I
[
Yk; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k,Yˆ1:k−1,Zˆ1:k ]+ I [M ; Yˆk ∣∣∣X1:k,Yˆ1:k−1,Yk,Zˆ1:k ] (22)
where Yk =
[
yik
]
i
is the collection of utility-related information computed by the USNs at time k. Using the definition of
conditional mutual information, we have
I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Yk, Zˆ1:k ] = h [Yˆk ∣∣∣X1:k,Yˆ1:k−1,Yk,Zˆ1:k]−h [Yˆk ∣∣∣X1:k,Yˆ1:k−1,Yk,Zˆ1:k,M]
Note that Yˆk can be written as Yˆk =
[
yik + V
i
k
]
i
. Thus, given Yk, Yˆk only depends on
{
V ik
}
i
which is independent of{
X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Yk, Zˆ1:k,M
}
. Thus, random variables
({
M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k
}
, Yk, Yˆk
)
form a Markov chain as
M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k −→ Yk −→ Yˆk. Hence, we have h
[
Yˆk
∣∣∣M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Yk, Zˆ1:k ] = h [Yˆk |Yk ]. It is straight forward
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to verify that random variables
({
X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k
}
, Yk, Yˆk
)
form a Markov chain as X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k −→ Yk −→ Yˆk,
thus h
[
Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Yk, Zˆ1:k ] = h [Yˆk |Yk ] which implies
I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Yk, Zˆ1:k ] = 0 (23)
Now, we expand I
[
Yk; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] as follows
I
[
Yk; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] = h [Yˆk ∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]− h [Yˆk ∣∣∣Yk, X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
= h
[
Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]− h [Yˆk |Yk ]
(a)
≤ h
[
Yˆk
]
− h
[
Yˆk |Yk
]
= I
[
Yk; Yˆk
]
(24)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. Combining (21)-(24), we have
I
[
M ;X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T
]
≤
T∑
k=1
I
[
Yk; Yˆk
]
≤ T max
pY (y),E[‖Y ‖2]≤α
I
[
Y ; Yˆ
]
= TCdown (25)
Combining (18), (19) and (25), we have
T ≥ (1− δ) logM2ǫ (S)− 1
Cdown
which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
Let D be a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries equal to 2ǫ. Let D be the lattice DZN , i.e., D = {Dz, z ∈ ZN}. Note
that the elements of D are at least 2ǫ apart. Let |D ∩ S| be the number of lattice points of D which lie in S. Clearly, M2ǫ (S)
is lower bounded by |D ∩ S|. We use the following result from [17] to obtain a lower bound on |D ∩ S| in terms of ǫ, volume
and surface area of S.
Lemma 3: [17] Let D be a lattice in RN with non-zero determinant, i.e., Det (D) 6= 0. Let S be a convex and compact
subset of RN . Then, we have
|D ∩ S| ≥ 1
Det (D)
(
Vol (S)− λN (D)
2
P (S)
)
(26)
where Vol (S) is the volume of S, P (S) is the surface area of S and λN (D) is the successive minima of D defined as the
smallest ρ such that there exist N linearly independent elements of lattice, {d1, · · · , dN ∈ D\ {0}} such that ‖di‖ ≤ ρ [18].
For the lattice D = DZN , we have Det (D) = (2ǫ)N and λN (D) = 2ǫ. Thus, M2ǫ (S) can be lower bounded as
M2ǫ (S) ≥
(
1
2ǫ
)N
(Vol (S) − ǫP (S)) (27)
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we first construct a finite subset of Fγ as follows. Recall that S contains a 2-ball of
radius
√
2ǫ. Let B√2ǫ denote such a ball. Also, let
S⋆2ǫ = {x⋆1, · · · ,x⋆4} (28)
be the set of four points in B√2ǫ which are 90 degrees apart. Thus, we have maxx⋆m,x⋆m′∈S⋆2ǫ ‖(x⋆m − x⋆m′)‖ = 2
√
2ǫ and
|S⋆2ǫ| = 4.
Here, for each x⋆m ∈ S⋆2ǫ (m = 1, · · · , 4), we construct a utility function vector Um (x) such that x⋆m becomes the Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the non-cooperative game with N players, utility function vector Um (x) and the action space S. To this
end, let A = [aij ]i,j be an N -by-N , symmetric, negative definite matrix with ‖A‖ = γ. Then, the utility function vector
Um (x) is constructed as Um (x) =
[
um,i
(
xi,x−i
)]
i
where um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
= aii2
(
xi
)2
+xi
(
−Aix⋆m +
∑
j 6=i aijx
j
)
and Ai
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is the ith row of A. It is straight forward to verify that x⋆m is a NE of the N -player non-cooperative game with the utility
function vector Um (x) and the constraint set S (see the proof of Lemma 1 in Subsection IV-A). Let
F ′γ = {Um (x) ,m = 1, · · · , 4} (29)
denote a finite set of utility vector functions. Since we have J∇˜Um(x) = A for m = 1, · · · , 4, each utility function vector
Um (·) belongs to the function class Fγ . Hence, F ′γ is a subset of Fγ . The class of N -player non-cooperative games with
utility function vectors in F ′γ and the action space S is denoted as G′γ = 〈N ,S,F ′γ〉. Here, we make the technical assumption
that each game in G′γ admits a unique NE.
For a given ǫ and δ < 12 , consider any algorithm A such that after T time-steps, we have
sup
U(·)∈Fγ
inf
i
Pr
(∥∥∥xNEi,U(·)−AT+1(X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ.
Since F ′γ is a subset of Fγ and the games in G′γ admit a unique NE, we have
sup
m=1,··· ,|S⋆2ǫ|
Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ.
Consider a genie-aided hypothesis test in which a genie selects a game instance from G′γ uniformly at random. Let x⋆M ∈ S⋆2ǫ
and UM (·) ∈ F ′ denote the NE and the utility function vector associated with the randomly selected game instance, respectively,
where M is a random variable uniformly distributed over the set {1, · · · , 4}. Also, let the random variable Mˆ = {1, · · · , 4}
encode the outcome of the genie-aided hypothesis test in Subsection IV-A. Then, using Lemma 2, Fano inequality and the fact
that |S⋆2ǫ| = 4, we have
δ ≥ 1−
1 + I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
2
(30)
Using (21) in Subsection IV-A, we have
I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
≤
T∑
k=1
I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] (31)
Under the partial-derivative computation model for USNs, yik can be written as
yik = −Aix⋆M +
∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
aij xˆ
j
k,usnπ(i)
= −Aix⋆M +
∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
aij
(
x
j
k +W
j
k,usnπ(i)
)
Thus, yˆik can be written as
yˆik = −Aix⋆M +

 ∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
aij
(
x
j
k +W
j
k,usnπ(i)
)+ V ik
= −Aix⋆M +

∑
j
aijx
j
k

+ Wˆ ik
where Wˆ ik =
(∑
j∈Nusnπ(i) aijW
j
k,usnπ(i)
)
+ V ik . Note that Yˆk =
[
yˆik
]
i
can be written as Yˆk = AXk − Ax⋆M + Wˆk where
Xk =
[
xik
]
i
and Wˆk =
[
Wˆ ik
]
i
.
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I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
= Ex⋆
M
[
D
[
p−Ax⋆
M
+WˆA
(x |x⋆M )
∥∥∥p−Ax⋆
M
+WˆA
(x)
]]
(a)
= Ex⋆
M
[
D
[
Ex⋆
M′
[
p−Ax⋆
M
+WˆA
(x |xM )
] ∥∥∥Ex⋆
M′
[
p−Ax⋆
M′
+WˆA
(x |x⋆M ′ )
]]]
(b)
≤ Ex⋆
M
[
Ex⋆
M′
[
D
[
p−Ax⋆
M
+WˆA
(x |x⋆M )
∥∥∥p−Ax⋆
M′
+WˆA
(x |x⋆M ′ )
]]]
≤ max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
D
[
p−Ax⋆m+WˆA (x)
∥∥∥p−Ax⋆
m′
+WˆA
(x)
]
(34)
Note that I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] can be upper bounded as:
I
[
M ; Yˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ] (a)= h [Yˆk ∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]− h [Yˆk ∣∣∣M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
= h
[
AXk −Ax⋆M + Wˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
− h
[
AXk −Ax⋆M + Wˆk
∣∣∣M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
(b)
= h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
− h
[
Wˆk
∣∣∣M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]
(c)
= h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆk
∣∣∣X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k ]− h [Wˆk]
(d)
≤ h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆk
]
− h
[
Wˆk
]
(e)
= h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆk
]
− h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆk |x⋆M
]
(e)
= h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆ1
]
− h
[
−Ax⋆M + Wˆ1 |x⋆M
]
= I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
(32)
where WˆA =
[
Wˆ i1
]
i
with Wˆ i1 =
∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
(
aijW
j
1,usnπ(i)
)
+ V i1 , (a) follows from the definition of conditional mutual
information, (b) follows from the translation invariance property of differential entropy, (c) follows from the fact that Wˆk is
independent of
{
M,X1:k, Yˆ1:k−1, Zˆ1:k
}
, (d) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (e) follows from
the translation invariance property of the differential entropy and the fact that the random vectors Wˆ1 and Wˆk have the same
probability density functions (PDFs). Combining (31) and (32), we have
I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
≤ T I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
(33)
Using the convexity of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance, I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
can be upper bounded as (34) where
D [p (x) ‖q (x) ] is the KL distance between the pair of PDFs (p (x) , q (x)), x⋆M ′ is a random vector taking value in S⋆2ǫ with
uniform distribution, independent of x⋆M , (a) follows from the fact that
p−Ax⋆
M
+WˆA
(x) = Ex⋆
M′
[
p−Ax⋆
M′
+WˆA
(x |x⋆M ′ )
]
since the random vectors −Ax⋆M + WˆA and −Ax⋆M ′ + WˆA have the same joint PDFs, and (b) follows from the convexity of
D [p (x) ‖q (x) ] in (p (x) , q (x)).
To evaluate the KL term in (34), we need to study the joint PDF of the random vector −Ax⋆m + WˆA. Note that random
vector −Ax⋆m + WˆA is a Gaussian distributed random vector with mean −Ax⋆m. The next lemma provides an expression for
the covariance matrix of Ax⋆m + WˆA.
Lemma 4: Let ΣA be an N -by-N matrix defined as
ΣA =diag
(
σ21 , · · · , σ2N
)
+ diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA
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D
[
p−Ax⋆m+WˆA (x)
∥∥∥p−Ax⋆
m′
+WˆA
(x)
]
=
1
2
(A (x⋆m − x⋆m′))⊤ (ΣA ◦G)−1A (x⋆m − x⋆m′)
≤ 1
2
‖A‖2 ‖(x⋆m − x⋆m′)‖2
∥∥∥(ΣA ◦G)−1∥∥∥
=
1
2
γ2 ‖(x⋆m − x⋆m′)‖2
∥∥∥(ΣA ◦G)−1∥∥∥ (36)
Also, let G = [Gij ]ij denote an N -by-N matrix defined as
Gij =
{
1 if π (i) = π (j)
0 Otherwise
Then, the covariance matrix of −Ax⋆m + WˆA can be written as ΣA ◦G where ◦ represents the Hadamard product.
Proof: Note that the covariance matrix of −Ax⋆m + WˆA is the same as that of WˆA =
[
Wˆ i1
]
i
where
Wˆ i1 =
∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
(
aijW
j
1,usnπ(i)
)
+ V i1 . The covariance of the ith and tth entries of WˆA can be written as
E
[
Wˆ i1Wˆ
t
1
]
=
{
σ2i δ [i− t]+σ2usnπ(i)Ai (At)
⊤ if π (i) = π (t)
0 Otherwise
where δ [·] denotes the Kronecker delta function, and Ai is the ith row of A. Using the definition of the matrix G, we have
E
[
Wˆ i1Wˆ
t
1
]
= σ2i δ [i− t] +σ2usnπ(i)Ai (At)
⊤
Git
Thus, the covariance of WˆA, i.e., CWˆA , can be written as
C
WˆA
=diag
(
σ21 , · · · , σ2N
)
+
(
diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA⊤
)
◦G
(a)
=
(
diag
(
σ21 , · · · , σ2N
)
+ diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA
)
◦G
=ΣA ◦G
where (a) follows from the fact that the matrix A is symmetric.
To use the expression of KL distance between two Gaussian PDFs, we need to ensure that the matrix ΣA ◦G is invertible.
This result is established in the next lemma.
Lemma 5: The matrix ΣA ◦G is an invertible matrix.
Proof: Note that ΣA can be written as
ΣA ◦G =diag
(
σ21 , · · · , σ2N
)
+
(
diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA
)
◦G (35)
The second term in (35) is the covariance of the random vector
 ∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
aijW
j
1,usnπ(i)


i
,
thus, it is a positive semi-definite matrix. Since diag
(
σ21 , · · · , σ2N
)
is positive definite, ΣA ◦G is a positive definite matrix.
Hence, ΣA ◦G is invertible.
Using the expression of KL distance between two Gaussian PDFs, we have (36) where ‖A‖ and
∥∥∥(ΣA ◦G)−1∥∥∥ are the induced
matrix norms of A and (ΣA ◦G)−1, respectively. Recall that the set S⋆2ǫ was selected such that maxxm,xm′∈S⋆2ǫ ‖(x⋆m − x⋆m′)‖ =
2
√
2ǫ and |S⋆2ǫ| = 4. Using this construction for S⋆2ǫ, (34) and (36), I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
can be upper bounded as
I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
≤ 4γ2ǫ2
∥∥∥(ΣA ◦G)−1∥∥∥ (37)
Note that
∥∥∥(ΣA ◦G)−1∥∥∥ can be upper bounded as (38) where λmax (·) and λmin (·) represent the maximum and minimum
eigenvalues, respectively, (a) follows from the fact that (ΣA ◦G)−1 is symmetric and positive definite, (b) follows from (35),
(c) follows from dual Weyl inequality [19] and (d) follows from the fact that diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA ◦ G is a
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∥∥∥(ΣA ◦G)−1∥∥∥ (a)= λmax ((ΣA ◦G)−1)
=
1
λmin (ΣA ◦G)
(b)
=
1
λmin
(
diag (σ21 , · · · , σ2N ) + diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA ◦G
)
(c)
≤ 1
λmin (diag (σ21 , · · · , σ2N )) + λmin
(
diag
(
σ2usnπ(1) , · · · , σ2usnπ(N)
)
AA ◦G
)
(d)
≤ 1
λmin (diag (σ21 , · · · , σ2N ))
=
1
mini σ2i
(38)
I [x⋆M ;−Ax⋆M + V1] ≤ max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
D
[
p−Ax⋆m+V1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Ax⋆
m′
+V1 (x)
]
(a)
= max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
D
[
p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x)
]
(40)
positive semi-definite matrix (see the proof of Lemma 5). Combining (30), (33), (37) and (38), we have
T ≥ (2 (1− δ)− 1)mini σ
2
i
4γ2ǫ2
which completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we first restrict our analysis to a finite subset of Fγ . To this end, let S⋆2ǫ and F ′γ denote
the 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S and the finite subset of Fγ , respectively, constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. For a given
ǫ and δ < 12 , consider any algorithm A which can solve any game in Gγ after T time-steps when the uplink channels are
noiseless, i.e.,
sup
U(·)∈Fγ
inf
i
Pr
(∥∥∥xNEi,U(·)−AT+1(X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ.
Using the proposed genie-aided hypothesis test in Subsection IV-C, (30) and (33), we have
δ ≥ 1−
1 + T I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
2
(a)
= 1− 1 + T I [x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + V1]
2
(39)
where x⋆M is a random vector taking value in S⋆2ǫ with uniform distribution, V1 =
[
V 11 , · · · , V N1
]⊤
and (a) follows from the
fact that the uplink channels are noiseless. Next, we obtain an upper bound on the mutual information term in (39) as follows.
In the absence of uplink noise, the inequality (34) can be written as (40) where Ai is the ith row of matrix A and (a) follows
from the fact that the entries of the random vector V1 are jointly independent.
The next lemma derives an asymptotic expansion for D
[
p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x)
]
.
Lemma 6: The KL distance between the probability distribution functions (PDFs) p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x) and p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x) canbe written as
D
[
p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x)
]
=
1
2
Ii (Ai (x⋆m − x⋆m′))2 +O
(
ǫ3
)
where Ii = −
∫∞
−∞ pV i (x)
d2
dx2
log pV i (x) dx denotes the Fisher information of pV i (x) with respect to a shift parameter.
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D
[
p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x)
]
=
∫
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m) (log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m)− log pV i (x+Aix⋆m′)) dx (41)
D
[
p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x)
]
= Aiǫ
⋆
m,m′
∫ ∞
−∞
d
dx
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m) dx−
1
2
(
Aiǫ
⋆
m,m′
)2 ∫ ∞
−∞
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m)
d2
dx2
log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m) dx
−
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
|α|=3
ǫ⋆m,m′
α
α!
(−Ai)α
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2 d
3
dx3
log pV i
(
x+Aix
⋆
m − sAiǫ⋆m,m′
)
ds

 pV i (x+Aix⋆m) dx
(a)
=
1
2
(
Aiǫ
⋆
m,m′
)2 Ii +Remi (46)
Proof: To prove this lemma, we first expand D
[
p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x)
∥∥∥p−Aix⋆m′+V i1 (x)
]
as (41) where p−Aix⋆m+V i1 (x) repre-
sents the PDF of −Aix⋆m + V i1 , and pV i (x) denotes the PDF of V i1 . Note that log pV i (x+Aix⋆m′) can be written as
log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m′) = log pV i
(
x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiǫ⋆m,m′
) (42)
where ǫ⋆m,m′ = x⋆m − x⋆m′ . We next use the Taylor expansion Theorem to expand the right hand side of (42). To this end, let
θ = [θ1, · · · , θN ]⊤ be an N -dimensional vector in RN . Then, using the Taylor expansion [20] of log pV i (x+Aix⋆m −Aiθ)
around θ = 0, we have
log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiθ) = log pV i (x+Aix⋆m) +
N∑
j=1
θj
∂
∂θj
log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiθ)|θ=0
+
∑
|α|=2
θα
α!
∂α log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiθ)|θ=0
+
∑
|α|=3
θα
α!
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2 ∂α log pV i (x+Aix⋆m − sAiθ) ds (43)
where α = [α1, · · · , αN ]⊤ is an N -tuple of positive integers, i.e., αi ∈ N0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , |α| =
∑
i αi, θ
α =
∏
i θ
αi
i ,
α! =
∏
i αi!,
∂
∂θj
log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiθ)|θ=0 = −Aij
d
dx
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m)
pV i (x+Aix⋆m)
(44)
and
∂α log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiθ) = ∂αN · · ·∂α1 log pV i (x+Aix⋆m −Aiθ)
= (−Ai)α d
|α|
dx|α|
log pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m −Aiθ) (45)
Setting θ = ǫ⋆m,m′ , and substituting (43)-(45) in (41), we have (46) where (a) follows from the fact that∫∞
−∞
d
dx
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m) dx = 0, Ii = −
∫∞
−∞ pV i (x)
d2
dx2
log pV i (x) dx is the Fisher information of the PDF pV i (x) with
respect to a shift parameter, and Remi is defined in (47).
To complete the proof, we show that Remi = O
(
ǫ3
)
. To this end, we upper bound |Remi| in (48) where (a) follows
from the assumption 3 in Subsection III-C, (b) follows from triangle inequality, (c) follows from the fact that 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and
(d) follows from the fact that
∥∥ǫ⋆m,m′∥∥ = ‖(x⋆m − x⋆m′)‖ ≤ 2√2ǫ (see the construction of S⋆2ǫ in the proof of Theorem
Remi =
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
|α|=3
ǫ⋆m,m′
α
α!
(−Ai)α
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2 d
3
dx3
log pV i
(
x+Aix
⋆
m − sAiǫ⋆m,m′
)
ds

 pV i (x+Aix⋆m) dx (47)
20
|Remi| ≤
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
|α|=3
∣∣ǫ⋆m,m′∣∣α
α!
|Ai|α
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2
∣∣∣∣ d3dx3 log pV i (x+Aix⋆m − sAiǫ⋆m,m′) ds
∣∣∣∣

 pV i (x+Aix⋆m) dx
(a)
≤
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
|α|=3
∣∣ǫ⋆m,m′∣∣α
α!
|Ai|α
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2
(
β1 + β2
∣∣x+Aix⋆m − sAiǫ⋆m,m′∣∣β3 ds)

 pV i (x+Aix⋆m) dx
(b)
≤
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
|α|=3
∣∣ǫ⋆m,m′∣∣α
α!
|Ai|α
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2
(
β1 + β2
(|x+ Aix⋆m|+ s ∣∣Aiǫ⋆m,m′∣∣)β3 ds)

 pV i (x+Aix⋆m) dx
(c)
≤
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
|α|=3
∣∣ǫ⋆m,m′∣∣α
α!
|Ai|α
∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2
(
β1 + β2
(
|x+Aix⋆m|+ ‖Ai‖
∥∥ǫ⋆m,m′∥∥)β3 ds
) pV i (x+Aix⋆m) dx
(d)
≤
(
2
√
2ǫ
)3 ∑
|α|=3
|Ai|α
α!
(∫ 1
0
3 (1− s)2 ds
)(
β1 +
∫ ∞
−∞
β2
(
|x+Aix⋆m|+ 2
√
2 ‖Ai‖ ǫ
)β3
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m) dx
)
(48)
∫ ∞
−∞
β2
(
|x+Aix⋆m|+ 2
√
2 ‖Ai‖ ǫ
)β3
pV i (x+Aix
⋆
m) dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
β2
(
|x|+ 2
√
2 ‖Ai‖ ǫ
)β3
pV i (x) dx
≤ β2
∞∑
j=1
(
j + 2
√
2 ‖Ai‖ ǫ
)β3
Pr
{∣∣V i1 ∣∣ ≥ j − 1}
= β2
∞∑
j=1
(
1 + 2
√
2
‖Ai‖ ǫ
j
)β3
jβ3Pr
{∣∣V i1 ∣∣ ≥ j − 1}
≤ β2
(
1 + 2
√
2 ‖Ai‖ ǫ
)β3 ∞∑
j=1
jβ3Pr
{∣∣V i1 ∣∣ ≥ j − 1} (49)
2 for more details). Note that the second integral in the right hand side of (48) can be upper bounded as (49). It is
straightforward to show that the series
∑∞
j=1 j
β3Pr
{∣∣V i1 ∣∣ ≥ j − 1} in (48) is bounded since the PDF of V i1 , i.e., pV i (x),
satisfies limx→∞ x(β3+1+r)Pr
{∣∣V i1 ∣∣ ≥ x} = 0 for some r > 0. Thus, we have Remi = O (ǫ3) which completes the proof.
Using (40) and (46), I [x⋆M ;−Ax⋆M + V1] can be upper bounded as (50) where (a) follows from the facts that
∑
i ‖Ai‖2 ≤
N ‖A‖ and maxx⋆m,x⋆m′∈S⋆2ǫ ‖(x⋆m − x⋆m′)‖ = 2
√
2ǫ, and (b) follows from the fact that ‖A‖ = γ. Since we have Remi = O
(
ǫ3
)
I [x⋆M ;−Ax⋆M + V1] ≤ max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
1
2
Ii (Ai (x⋆m − x⋆m′))2 +Remi
≤ max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
1
2
Ii (Ai (x⋆m − x⋆m′))2 + max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
Remi
≤ max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
1
2
Ii ‖x⋆m − x⋆m′‖2 ‖Ai‖2 + max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
Remi
(a)
≤ 4ǫ2N ‖A‖2max
i
Ii + max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
Remi
(b)
= 4Nǫ2γ2max
i
Ii + max
x⋆m,x
⋆
m′
∈S⋆2ǫ
N∑
i=1
Remi (50)
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(see the proof of Lemma 6), (50) implies
I [x⋆M ;−Ax⋆M + V1] ≤ 4Nǫ2γ2max
i
Ii +O
(
ǫ3
) (51)
Combining (39) and (51), we have
T ≥ 2 (1− δ)− 1
4Nǫ2γ2maxi Ii +O (ǫ3)
which completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
To establish this result, we first construct a finite subset of Fγ . To this end, let S2ǫ denote an arbitrary 2ǫ-distinguishable
subset of S. Note that the set S2ǫ is not necessarily a maximal size 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S. For each x⋆m ∈ S2ǫ
(m = 1, · · · , |S2ǫ|), we construct a utility function vector Um (x) such that x⋆m is the NE of the non-cooperative game with
N players, utility function vector Um (x) and the action space S.
The utility function vector Um (x) (m = 1, · · · , |S2ǫ|) is constructed as follows. Let A = [aij ]i,j be an N -by-N , symetric,
negative definite matrix with ‖A‖ ≥ γ. The utility function vector Um (x) is defined as Um (x) =
[
um,i
(
xi,x−i
)]
i
where
um,i
(
xi,x−i
)
= aii2
(
xi
)2
+ xi
(
−Aix⋆m +
∑
j 6=i aijx
j
)
where Ai is the ith row of A. Let F ′ be the finite set of utility
function vectors defined as
F ′γ = {Um (·) ∈ F ,m = 1, · · · , |S2ǫ|} (52)
Clearly, we have |F ′| = |S2ǫ|
It is straight forward to verify that Um (x) belongs to Fγ which implies that F ′γ is a subset of Fγ . We refer to the N -player
non-cooperative games with the utility functions in F ′γ and the action space S as G′γ = 〈N ,S,F ′γ〉. Similar to the proof of
Theorem 1, we make the technical assumption that each game in G′γ admits a unique Nash equilibrium (NE).
Now, for a given ǫ and δ, consider any algorithm A for which after T time-steps, we have
sup
U(·)∈Fγ
inf
i
Pr
(∥∥∥xNEi,U(·)−AT+1(X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ.
Since F ′γ is a subset of Fγ and each game in G′γ admits a unique NE, we have
sup
m=1,··· ,|S2ǫ|
Pr
(∥∥∥x⋆m −AT+1 (X1:T , Yˆ1:T , Zˆ1:T)∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ.
Using Lemma 2 in Subsection IV-A2 and Fano inequality, we have
δ ≥ 1−
1 + I
[
M ; Mˆ
]
log |S2ǫ| (53)
Combing (33) and (53), we have
T ≥ (1− δ) log |S2ǫ| − 1
I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
where x⋆M is a random vector taking value in S2ǫ with uniform distribution and WˆA =
[
Wˆ i1
]
i
with
Wˆ i1 =
∑
j∈Nusnπ(i)
(
aijW
j
1,usnπ(i)
)
+ V i1 . Optimizing over the choice of the matrix A and the 2ǫ-distinguishable set S2ǫ,
we have
T ≥ sup
A:‖A‖≥2,S2ǫ∈S
(1− δ) log |S2ǫ| − 1
I
[
x
⋆
M ;−Ax⋆M + WˆA
]
which completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the complexity of solving two game classes in a distributed setting in which players obtain the
required information for updating their actions by communicating with a set of system nodes over noisy communication
channels. We first considered the game class G which is comprised of all N -player non-cooperative games with a continuous
action space such that any game in G admits at least a Nash equilibrium. We obtained a lower bound on the complexity of
solving the game class G to an ǫ accuracy which depends on the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set and the total
22
capacity of the communication channels which convey utility-related information to players. We also studied the complexity
of solving a subclass of G under both Gaussian and non-Gaussian noise models.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Li and T. Basar, “Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria,” Automatica, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 523 – 533, 1987.
[2] S.-J. Liu and M. Krstic, “Stochastic nash equilibrium seeking for games with general nonlinear payoffs,” SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1659–1679, 2011.
[3] A. Nemirovski and D. Yudin, Problem complexity and method efficiency in optimization. Wiley, 1983.
[4] A. Agarwal, M. J. Wainwright, P. L. Bartlett, and P. K. Ravikumar, “Information-theoretic lower bounds on the oracle complexity of convex optimization,”
in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 22. Curran Associates, Inc., 2009, pp. 1–9.
[5] A. Agarwal, P. L. Bartlett, P. Ravikumar, and M. J. Wainwright, “Information-theoretic lower bounds on the oracle complexity of stochastic convex
optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 3235–3249, May 2012.
[6] M. Raginsky and A. Rakhlin, “Information-based complexity, feedback and dynamics in convex programming,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 7036–7056, Oct 2011.
[7] K. G. Jamieson, R. Nowak, and B. Recht, “Query complexity of derivative-free optimization,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
25. Curran Associates, Inc., 2012, pp. 2672–2680.
[8] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, M. J. Wainwright, and A. Wibisono, “Finite sample convergence rates of zero-order stochastic optimization methods,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25. Curran Associates, Inc., 2012, pp. 1439–1447.
[9] ——, “Optimal rates for zero-order convex optimization: The power of two function evaluations,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 61,
no. 5, pp. 2788–2806, May 2015.
[10] Y. Singer and J. Vondrak, “Information-theoretic lower bounds for convex optimization with erroneous oracles,” in Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 28. Curran Associates, Inc., 2015, pp. 3204–3212.
[11] E. Nekouei, T. Alpcan, G. Nair, and R. J. Evans, “Lower bounds on the best-case complexity of solving a class of non-cooperative games,” in 6th IFAC
Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems (NecSys), Sept 2016.
[12] K. Leyton-Brown and Y. Shoham, Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction, 1st ed. Morgan and Claypool Publishers,
2008.
[13] A. Kolmogorov and V. Tikhomirov, “ǫ-entropy and ǫ-capacity of sets in function spaces,” Uspekhi Matematicheskikh Nauk, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 3–86,
1959.
[14] R. J. Gardner, “The brunn-minkowski inequality,” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 355–405, 2002.
[15] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 520–534, 1965.
[16] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. Wiley-Interscience, 2006.
[17] U. Schnell, “Lattice inequalities for convex bodies and arbitrary lattices,” Monatshefte fu¨r Mathematik, vol. 1993, no. 116, pp. 331–337, 1959.
[18] R. Fischlin and J. Seifert, Cryptography and Coding. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg, 1999, ch. Tensor-based trapdoors for CVP and their application to
public key cryptography, pp. 244–257.
[19] T. Tao, Topics in Random Matrix Theory, ser. Graduate studies in mathematics. American Mathematical Soc., 2012.
[20] J. Duistermaat and J. Kolk, Distributions: Theory and Applications. Birkhuser Basel, New York : Springer, 2010.
